Regular Education as a Tool of Counter-cyclical Employment Policy

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Introduction

- Experience of young workers after school is short-duration job search and frequent job change
- Job loss is not serious for them if there are enough other jobs to take
- But lack of job creation in recession can be serious if unemployment durations become too long

Policy responses

- Policy makers respond with various measures, such as help with job search, training, job creation in public sector
- The question investigated here is: Should regular education be used as one such measure?

Plan

- Private decisions
- Impact of recession
- Social efficiency
- Policy response
- Types of education
- □ Timing issues
- Standards

Private decisions

- □ Based on Becker classic work on human capital: demand for education up to the point where the current cost equals the expected future higher pay
- Discount future higher pay by the probability of becoming unemployed.
- It increases the returns to education because better educated individuals experience less unemployment

Costs of education

- For the individual, the costs are foregone income during school attendance and direct costs
- For society, the costs are foregone output of those in school, and the input (opportunity cost) of teachers

Implications of recession

- In recession, foregone income and output both down because of higher unemployment
- □ Demand for education up.
- Three channels through which higher unemployment influences demand for education

Impact of higher unemployment 1

- Effect on expected foregone income
- Effect is likely to be big because of
 - differential impact of unemployment and rising costs with duration
 - risk aversion
 - Impact on demand for "gap" year

Impact of higher unemployment 1/cont.

- The incomes of those affected by unemployment suffer a lot
- Rising unemployment durations have both big contemporaneous effects and future "scarring" effects
- Scarring effects for youths not as big as for adults but still present

Impact of higher unemployment 1/cont.

- Risk aversion likely to have big impact because of the high cost on those affected by unemployment
- Gap year demand could collapse because if young people cannot get jobs to finance it, they stay on in school instead

Impact of higher unemployment 2

- Probability of future unemployment lower with more education
- □ No reason why the response to this should be larger in recession, because by the time education ends recession will be over (If not too long!)
- Maybe recession makes young people more aware of the risks

Impact of higher unemployment 3

- Family incomes decline and older children may be asked to leave school to support depleted incomes
- Not an efficient response to recession, education decision should be made on the basis of costs and expected returns, not current liquidity
- But imperfect capital markets could lead to it

Empirical evidence

- Strong evidence in favour of higher demand for education in recession
- Variety of elasticity estimates and no computations of quantitative impact
- No benchmark number for the elasticity

Social efficiency

- Are there likely to be differences between social and private costs of education?
- Missing capital markets may reduce private demand below social
- Missing insurance markets may push private demand above social – insurance against unemployment, inefficient demand for education

Social vs. private decisions

- □ Social costs: foregone output of students and teachers
- Private costs: foregone income and fees of students
- Social benefit: increased productivity
- Private benefits: increased incomes
- □ Same? Impact of recession on each?

Missing capital markets

- Missing capital markets likely to be important in countries where there is reliance on family incomes to finance education
- Also in countries where there is no good family protection against income loss

Missing capital markets cont.

☐ But with modern educational financing (loans, grants), and economic development, family pressure on young to give up education to help family finances unlikely to be important

Missing insurance markets

- But insurance against youth unemployment not likely to be perfect because of moral hazard
- So deviation likely to be in direction of more private demand for education in response to rise in unemployment than is socially optimal

Missing insurance markets

- Recession increases the risk of job loss
- If risks could be pooled so each person paid a premium equal to the average loss, private decisions to increase education demand are efficient
- But risks cannot be pooled because of moral hazard in job search

Social costs

- How do the costs of using education as insurance compare with the costs of moral hazard?
- No quantitative models of this trade-off but costs of education high (foregone output, teacher shortage, late entry of "overeducated" workers) and moral hazard reduced with active measures
- Education unlikely to dominate as insurance instrument

Government responses

- Governments should make more resources available for regular education in recession, to maintain standards in the face of increased demand
- By how much?
- As much as the increase in private demand provided allowance is made for the missing insurance markets

Joint policies

- Best way to deal with insurance demand for education is separately, through UI benefits and ALPM
- Combination of ALMP that insure young person against long duration unemployment and expansion of education finance to satisfy demand
- Student loans and grants kept at current levels

Effectiveness of ALMP

- □ For maximum short-term impact of ALMP employment subsidies or direct job creation by the government seems to be best
- But apprentice-type training for youths also likely to have long-term impact

Types of education

- What type of education should the government support in recession?
- Since demand for extra places is temporary, it should be for types that are less expensive
- Demand for inexpensive courses such as social services has been rising in Sweden

Types of demand cont

- Demand for expensive courses such as medicine or sciences has been declining in Sweden
- So meeting demand types seems good option
- General education better than specific because specific training better left to firms

Implications for labour market

- Increasing education provision removes youths from the labour market one-forone
- No impact on job creation
- □ So it is likely that youth employment rate would increase and demand for other ALMP would decrease
- ☐ Likely also to benefit women's market, which is competitive with young market

Timing issues

- When should more spending on education be authorised and for how long?
- Demand for education in recession likely to behave like discouraged worker effect
- Young person tries his/her luck in the labour market and if unsuccessful goes back to school

Timing of expansion

- □ So government will need to provide extra places after start of recession
- But needs to be ready with policy as soon as it becomes clear that there will be recession
- It might consider allowing delayed entry to facilitate job search and information gathering after completing an educational cycle

Duration?

- Some evidence from US that in recession the demand for short courses increases
- Students stay in college until course is completed
- So lock-in effects present: those in college do not search and the flow into jobs when job creation recovers is slow to pick up
- But because of short courses not likely to be too serious

Other implications

- After end of recession, there are more graduates than in normal times
- Graduate incomes might suffer and if youths react to current observations, demand for education might fall too much
- Freeman-like cobweb cycles may be the outcome

Educational achievement

- In order to maintain standards, universities should come under no pressure to accept more students without extra teaching resources and space
- This might be expensive to achieve, especially space

Fall in standards?

- □ Some fall in standards may be inevitable because of it
- Also because new entry is not likely to be as academically able as steadystate entry
- Policy question is, is a fall in standards not a good alternative to unemployment?

Standards in recession

- Inevitable fact is that in recession labour market outcomes, government revenues and standards of service suffer
- Spreading costs through reductions of standards across a broad range of services, including education, may be better outcome than shifting all burden on to individuals in the labour market

Key conclusion

- The key conclusion is that recessions are times when both the private and social cost of regular education are low
- They are good times to take advantage of and enhance society's human capital

Policy dilemmas

- But social and private demand are not well matched
- Social efficiency requires more resources for unemployment insurance, active policies and education
- Spreading limited resources across these seems preferable to bunching on one